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VANDA LAMM
Professor Vanda Lamm, Cor. Member of theHungarian Academy of Sciences; Director, Institute forLedal Studies, Hungarian Academy of SciencesOVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATIVE STEPS TAKEN TO FOSTER A MORE EFFECTIVENUCLEAR LIABILITY REGIMEIntroduction1. The Concept of State Responsibility  The Draft Articles of the International Law CommissionThe concept of State responsibility had formerly been considered and put forward by the international scien-tific community. After cumbersome but protracted efforts made by various forums of international policy-makersand actors, the International Law Commission (ILC)1 adopted a quasi-treaty text designated as ILCs Draft Articlesof 2001 on the issue of State responsibility (Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts) without abinding force on States, regarding that these Articles have not yet been materialised in the form of a binding inter-national treaty. Nevertheless, we should take them into account as a communis opinio doctorum and a presumptivesummary embodying and preserving the main theoretical concepts of State responsibility, which shall manifestthemselves either in customary international law or in State practices, or, in both of these sources of internationallaw (Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)2. Evidently, it is deemed essential that the provi-sions of the Draft Articles have been surveyed and analysed in view of the concerned legal area parallelly to nuclearlegal conventions, on the one hand, if the regulation of State responsibility relating to instruments of nuclear law hasnot been existed, or, on the other hand, if the governing regulation would be incapable of encompassing all relevantaspects of the aforementioned responsibility under the framework of nuclear and international law.In general point of view, the ILC had adhered the traditional inter-State approach in its codification work;thereupon the ILC adopted its Draft Articles, irrespective of the increasingly emerging question of the responsibil-ity of non-State actors, such as multinational financial entities or individuals. Obviously, under public internationallaw, if an act of any State has been wilfully and maliciously committed, or the given act would have been commit-ted in a gravely negligent manner implying a breach of an international obligation, these facts (causal relationbetween cause and the result of a conduct imputable to the State as damage or harm) would entail the responsibili-ty of the State, therefore, compensation and reparations shall supervene pursuant to the generally accepted rule ofcustomary international law. So, the term and legal content of State responsibility shall be distinguished from lia-bility-based issues (irrespective of its two fragments, the concept of State and civil liability) by means of exact con-cept-formation in the general area of international law (lex generalis) and specifically, under the increasing but spo-radic sphere of nuclear law (lex specialis).Additionally, the codification process conducted by the ILC was frequently self-contradictory by reason of thedeparting legal thinking of the five rapporteurs (Garcia Amador, Ago, Riphagen, Arangio-Ruiz and Crawford), scil-icet, their different conceptions deriving from their diverse backgrounds attributed to divergent State establishmentsand legal systems. Therefore, in the ambit of the problematic and controversial distinction tending to exonerate thesubstantial State responsibility vs. State liability debates often flared up, which basically influenced the fundamen-tal approach of this subject matter. The Draft Articles unambiguously contain only rules concerning State responsi-bility according with State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts phrase, meaning that the Draft Articlesprecluded the possibility of raising liability-issues upon the interpretation of its text, since it applied the phrase ofwrongful act. The term responsibility postulates the wrongful act of a State3, while the term liability for injuriesmay be considered to be attached to lawful and unlawful acts, as well4. Presumably, this distinction had been con-ducive to the decision on which the ILC further divided the liability topic into two projects in 1997. Subsequently,the first project of the ILC in this issue embodied the work on primary obligations relating to the prevention of trans-boundary harm from hazardous activities, while the second project concentrated on liability for injurious conse-quences of acts not prohibited by international law. In the characterization of this ramification, the ILC evolved tran-scending rules and clauses being severally peculiar to both subjects considering the virtual interrelationship of thegiven spheres5.2. State Responsibility in the Context of Public International LawThe exact distinction between the contradicting and ambiguous notions of responsibility and liability impliestwo different approaches to the similar and analogous problem. Derivatively, these terms are sometimes applied
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without discretion to these subjects in manners, which indicates that the occurrence and evidences of damages orlosses are not a sufficient or even a necessary basis for responsibility, and the conditions of the two terms were sym-biotic and identical6.According to the strict point of view of international law, however, responsibility and liability obtain, when abreach of an obligation laid down under international law has occurred, and this act or omission per se does not needto involve the requirement of the element of either negligence or malice. As for the standpoint of ILC, as it is man-ifest in the abstract of the Draft Articles, every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the internationalresponsibility of that State (Article 1 of the Draft Articles)7. Thus, the received scientific and judicial view preservedin Article 1 covers the relations having arisen under international law from the internationally wrongful act of a State(either act or omission, or both of them), whether such relations are limited to the wrongdoing State and one injuredState or whether they extend also to other States or indeed to other subjects of international law; or whether they arecentred on obligations of restitution or compensation or also give the injured State the possibility of responding byway of counter-measures8. The responsibility of a State embraces the duty to make reparations for the damages9,resulting from a failure following by the fact that the State concerned has not complied with international obliga-tions incumbent upon the State, moreover this State shall have been strictly and legally responsible for accomplish-ing its mandatory international obligations. Consequently, the rules of State responsibility stipulate and determinewhether international obligations have been breached. Thus evidently, an internationally wrongful act entailing Stateresponsibility through the breach of an obligation shall be followed by sanctions10 (such as reparation, restitutionand compensation11). Contrary to the aforementioned statements, it has to be recorded, in sum, that the exact normative concept ofState responsibility is still missing both from the legal system of international and nuclear law; concretely, there areno accepted and established binding rules existing in relation to the discussed field of State responsibility.3. Liability in the Context of Public International LawThe term liability comparing with the term responsibility12 has been put forward as an issue in cases wheredamage or loss was incurred as a result of an activity having been conducted neither in breach of an internationalobligation, nor in breach of the States due diligence obligations (lawful acts involving transboundary damage).In the 1960s and 1970s, liability and compensation conventions of considerable number were concluded inorder to address two of the most hazardous and significant transboundary risks: oil pollution at sea and nuclear acci-dents13. With the substantive thoughts of Fitzmaurice, since the early 1960s, two separate major regimes have co-existed14. These genuine codification techniques have shown exemplar paradigms influencing over the rapidprogress on codification of the forthcoming decades. In the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of the ILCs activitiesrelated to the elaboration of the notion of State responsibility, ILC gave its expression for establishing a new cate-gory of liability having denominated its project as International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising outof Acts Not Prohibited by International Law.In the 1990s, during the debates and the legislation process within the framework of the Sixth Committee ofthe U.N. General Assembly concerning the term liability (State and civil, as well), several possible options wereevolved and elaborated upon the idea that the term liability should be ensued from significant transboundary harm(including the type of high-risk harms, such as nuclear damages and losses, etc.). Thus, State liability consists in aliability for damages caused to another State (the damage shall be emerged beyond the borders of the origin State,as the inter-State approach imposed by the ILC requires and admits the liability issue) according to international law,while civil liability embodies the liability of a natural or legal entity for damages caused to any other entity ongrounds of municipal and international law. From a doctrinal point of view, on principle and beyond civil liability15,State liability must be primary, because States have ultimate responsibility for all activities within their jurisdictionand control and must be held to account for any injurious consequences16. At its forty-ninth session, in 1997, theILCs Working Group concluded an agreement in which the expert body split the topic into two parts separately17,one was under the working title of prevention of transboundary damage from hazardous activities18 and the otherwas under the working title of international liability in case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of haz-ardous activities19.The range of various categories of liability specified in the position of the Sixth Committee had been divergedfrom the customary classification of the fault-based20, strict21 and exclusive22 liability in pertinent conventions andthe doctrinal theories elaborated by jurisprudence on the given subject. The concept of strict liability and the chan-nelled liability of (a) State(s) had been extinguished, since they were only applicable in the regime of civil liability-based documents, where exclusively the operator was liable (or responsible) for activities causing transboundaryeffects, including nuclear accidents or radiological emergency. According to the presumptive objectives of ILC,residual (subsidiary or supplementary, as well) and joint or multiple liability shall govern the regime in which Statesought to compensate victims, who were not satisfied by the operator (after the exploitation of the insufficient sub-sidiary compensation fund) on the obvious ground that the State concerned has failed to fulfil its obligations and acausal relation between that failure and the emerging damage obtains. The entire topic of liability (irrespective of State or civil liability aspects within the area of international ornuclear law as a ius specialis) has remained controversial throughout its history in the ILCs procedure due to theinterfering conditions attributed to the peculiarities of international law and the uncertain character of the account-ability for State-involved injurious activities being discussed aforesaid23. All the while, the Draft Articles have pre-tended to clarify the contradictions and anomalies persisting in connection with the existence of a breach of an inter-338
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national obligation. Being compatible with this attitude, Article 12 of the Draft Articles reads as follows: [T]hereis a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in conformity with what isrequired of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character.As ILCs work had legibly demonstrated in the early phase of the codification process, a State could be liableeven for acts that were perfectly lawful, but in the event of injurious consequences these acts shall be resulted in theadmission of liability of the origin State. As opposed to the doctrinal concept of State responsibility, which arisesexclusively from faulty, malicious and unlawful acts prohibited by international law, the facts of the internationalliability of a State may arise from both lawful and unlawful acts. Accordingly, increasing number of rules of liabil-ity for acts not prohibited by international law are irrespective of whether the activity was faulty or lawful; conse-quently, they emphasise the harm regardless of the conduct in this rudimentary phase of institualization.4. Liability-based Issues within the Entire Nuclear FieldAfter the tragic occasion of Chernobyl accident in 1986, it was indisputable that the civil liability regime wasseriously deficient and called for rectification, as well. Aware of the well-known fact, the former Soviet Union (theInstallation State) was not a Party to either of the respective conventions; the issues of due reparation mechanismsin line with issues of responsibility and/or liability had been left out of consideration. Nonetheless, both liabilityregimes in given time set the upper limit of the operators liability at USD 5 Million, thus in case, if the Soviet Unionwould have been a Party to either of the liability regimes, the contingent amount of compensation would have beeninsignificant, having counted the immense value of harmful transboundary effects in mind. Re-examining the present status of the legal background in the light of the time has passed, it has to be men-tioned that several fundamental liability-based multilateral treaties have been signed but have not yet entered intoforce in the domain of nuclear law24. Being supplemented with the national legislation of the States, where exclu-sively the objective liability rules govern the field, it goes without saying, the questions of liability have to be sole-ly emphasized in the shape of absolute liability25. The hypothetical responsibility-based nuclear field in line with thecommitment of compensating damages and losses would undoubtedly entail the undesired outcome being illustrat-ed as the escape of States from the whole nuclear regulation process. The same as in international law, in the fieldof nuclear law there is a demand, so the more participating States are in the process irrespective of the other, moresufficient and less restricted contingent option being existed, it should be appreciated as the better choice leavingthe more efficient but less accepted option out of consideration in the present point of view. Additionally, for assert-ing these international endeavours, more and more matters in question are governed by absolute/objective liabilityin the territory of municipal laws by means of State acts and governmental decrees on third party nuclear liabilityissues. The core subject of these laws on the sphere of absolute/objective liability should be regarded as a joint andmutual governing general principle of the nuclear legislation of States; either considered to be as a guidance for thefuture codification prospects of States, or labelled as a direct source of the international domain of nuclear law inabsence of binding international treaties and concerning applied international customs of the field.The primary and main principle of the nuclear liability regimes is the clause embodying the principle of chan-nelling the liability that the operator26 of the nuclear installation is exclusively liable for damage emerging fromaccidents at its installation or during the transport of nuclear substances to/from that installation27. Hence, the con-ventions require operators to hold liability insurance or other financial security, on terms specified by nationalauthorities, unless the operator is itself a State28. Nevertheless, relevant steps have been taken in the framework of the ILC, the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  Nuclear Energy Agency(OECD-NEA) for drafting the direct or, in more frequent ways, the residual liability of States within the scope ofobligations by means of providing additional pooling-type amounts or guaranteeing complementary financial andinsurance-based mechanisms through the States. The fundamental underlying idea of the subsequent regulatorywork derived from the general and global recognition that exclusively sufficient financial resources shall be madeavailable for the State to ensure the compensation of victims of an accident29. Providing compensation for victimson a residual basis has been considered, since States are deemed liable to remedy the defects of a civil liabilityregime according to the specific restrictions related to the tiers of compensation. States have the obligation to com-pensate victims through its public funds and resources regardless of the fact whether the States had carried out activ-ities causing damages (de iure exemption, but de facto liability to pay or compensate). In response to the previousfundamental shift, during the last decades an appreciable change of approach had been discerned, since the conceptof State liability was formulated and transformed into scientific thought or pivotal provisions of a few draft con-ventions.5. The Concept of Liability and the Future Prospects within the Single Liability Regimes. (To be continued).
1 According to the provision of Article 13 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommen-dations for the purpose of [] encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification. For administeringthis duty, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 174 (II) of 21 November 1947, establishing the ILC and approving its Statute. Asillustrated by Article 1 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, [T]he International Law Commission shall have for itsobject the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification. 2 As the last rapporteur (James Crawford of Australia) of the project stated, regardless of the eventual form of the articles it is tobe hoped that they will make a significant contribution to the codification and progressive development of the international legal rules
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of responsibility. See, Crawford, James: The International Law Commissions Articles on State Responsibility. Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2002. 60.3 The responsibility of States for transboundary damage depends principally on objective fault, i.e. a failure to act with due careor diligence, or a breach of treaty, or the commission of a prohibited act. Cf. Boyle, Alan: Globalising Environmental Liability: TheInterplay of National and International Law. Journal of Environmental Law, Vol. 17 (2005) No. 1, 3.4 In the approach of the Blacks Law Dictionary, the term liability means the quality or state of being legally obligated oraccountable. See, Blacks Law Dictionary (ed.: Garner, Bryan), Thomson-West, St. Paul, 2004. 932. In this sense, by way of compar-ison with the term responsibility, liability does not require from the activity resulting damage to be unlawful and wrongful, but has avigorous substantive content of being a financial and pecuniary obligation in the form of remedies in order to obtain compensation forthe losses incurred.5 See in details, Boyle: op. cit. 3-6. and Crawford: op. cit. 75-76.6 With a laconic but pertinent remark, liability or responsibility is the bond of necessity that exists between the wrongdoer andthe remedy of the wrong. See, Blacks Law Dictionary, 932.7 An internationally wrongful act of a State may consist in one or more actions and omissions or a combination of both. Compare,Crawford: op. cit. 77.8 See in details, ibid. 79-80.9 The obligation to make full reparation is the second general obligation of the responsible State consequent upon the commis-sion of an internationally wrongful act; and it is regarded to be an immediate corollary, as Crawford illustrated. Cf. Crawford: op. cit.201-202.10 Having highlighted the widely accepted view of the theory of international law, Nagy declared that a sanction is applied bythe injured party in all instances, whereas reparations are paid by the wrongdoer. See, Nagy, Károly: The Problem of Reparation inInternational Law. Questions of International Law, Volume 3. (1986) 174.11 The notions and quasi-definition of restitution, reparation and compensation as rules of customary international law can befound in Articles 31, 35 and 36 of the ILCs Draft Articles.12 On the discrepancies and feasible clarification of the emphasis, see, Horbach, Nathalie: The Confusion about StateResponsibility and International Liability. Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 4 (1991) No. 1, 47-74.13 See e.g., the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage; the 1971 International Convention onthe Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage; the 1971 Convention relating to Civil Liabilityin the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material; the 1960 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability; the 1963 BrusselsSupplementary Convention; the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and the 1964 Additional Protocol toAmend the Paris Convention. Prior to the efforts taken in the early 1960s, the 1954 International Convention on the Prevention ofPollution of the Sea by Oil has already been signed for attempting to prevent the sea from impairment caused by leaking oil.14 See, Fitzmaurice, Malgosia: International Responsibility and Liability, in: Bodansky, Daniel  Brunnée, Jutta  Hey, Ellen(eds.): The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 2007. 1025.15 In order to attract broad adherence to the nuclear liability conventions, States must have been committed themselves in a leg-islation process leading to the general acceptance of civil liability as a first and principal layer of the liability issue. Birnie and Boylerepresent the doctrinal point of view as the possibility of State responsibility is not precluded, but the scheme of the civil liability treatiesinvolves States only as guarantors of the operators strict liability, or in providing additional compensation funds. According to the con-comitant of their position, in neither case does the polluting State bear responsibility for the whole loss. See further, Birnie, Patricia Boyle, Alan: International Law and the Environment. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. 473.16 Cf. De la Fayette, Louise: Towards a New Regime of State Responsibility for Nuclear Activities. Nuclear Law Bulletin, No.50 (1992) 28.17 Compare, Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Vol. II (1997) Part Two, 59. Paras. 165-167.18 In 2001, the ILC adopted the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities and submitted to the U. N. GeneralAssembly.19 In 2006, the ILC adopted the Draft Principles of on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out ofHazardous Activities and submitted to the U. N. General Assembly.20 Pursuant to the generally accepted scientific view in municipal laws, fault liability is based upon some degree of blamewor-thiness. See, Blacks Law Dictionary, 933.21 Referring to the analogous case of civil law in municipal legal systems, strict liability shall be illustrated as the possible typeof liability that does not depend upon actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to makesomething safe. Cf. Blacks Law Dictionary, 933.22 On the double motive of the acknowledgement of the operators exclusive liability, see further, Civil Liability for NuclearDamage, adopted by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 2 September 2004. See, GOV/INF/2004/9-GC(48)/INF/5.23 Nevertheless, as Birnie and Boyle highlighted, the successful articulation of criteria for adopting a general principle of strictliability applicable to cases of environmental harm would be an invaluable contribution to the subject. Compare with, Birnie-Boyle: op.cit. 190.24 The 1960 Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability, the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, the 1963 ViennaConvention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the 1964 Additional Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention, the 1982 Protocol toAmend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary Convention, 1988 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of theVienna Convention and the Paris Convention and the 1997 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention have been signed and enteredinto force in this field.Other liability-based instruments, as the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation and the 2004 Protocol to Amend theParis Convention (and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention, as well) have been signed but not yetentered into force.25 As the facts about the double and comprehensive legislation stand, national tort laws or civil codes may also supply evidenceof a general principle of strict or absolute liability for dangerous or unusual activities, but such principles do not invariably cover
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nuclear installations. Furthermore, a single important benefit of the nuclear conventions is thus to clarify and harmonize the standardof liability. Compare, Birnie-Boyle: op. cit. 478.26 The notion of operator incorporates the licensee or other designated or recognized entity. The duty of designation or recog-nition shall be within the competence of the national government or the national legislator body, pursuant to the sovereign provisionsof the municipal legal system. See, Article 1 a. vi) of the 1960 Paris Convention, which illustrates that the "[O]perator" in relation toa nuclear installation means the person designated or recognised by the competent public authority as the operator of that installation.Furthermore, akin to the previous definition, Article I 1. c) of the 1963 Vienna Convention reads as follows: "[O]perator", in relationto a nuclear installation, means the person designated or recognized by the Installation State as the operator of that installation.27 As for this issue in the light of the sphere of liability regimes, see in details, Horbach, Nathalie: Nuclear Liability forInternational Transport Accidents under the Modernised Nuclear Liability Conventions: an Assessment. International Journal ofNuclear Law, Vol. 1 (2006) No. 2, 189-198.28 See, Birnie-Boyle: op. cit. 479. However, regardless of the operators financial solvency, funds should thus be available in theevent of an accident. Compare, ibid.29 See in details, Lamm, Vanda: The Protocol Amending the 1963 Vienna Convention. In: International Nuclear Law in the Post-Chernobyl Period, OECD-NEA, Paris, 2006. 174.
Ðåçþìå
Ïðàâîâ³ òåîð³¿ äåðæàâíî¿ â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ òà äåðæàâíî¿/öèâ³ëüíî¿ â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ çà íåïðàâîì³ðí³ ä³¿ òà ä³¿, çàáîðîíåí³ì³æíàðîäíèì çàêîíîäàâñòâîì, òðèâàëèé ÷àñ áóëè ïðåäìåòîì äèñêóñ³¿ â ì³æíàðîäíîìó ïóáë³÷íîìó ïðàâ³. Íàö³îíàëüíå çàêîíî-äàâñòâî ðåãóëþº ñèñòåìè öèâ³ëüíî¿ â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ ó ïîë³ ïðèâàòíèõ çàêîí³â ãðîìàäÿí äåðæàâè. ßê ïðîòèëåæíå âèçíà÷åííþïîíÿòòÿ öèâ³ëüíî¿ â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³, íàö³îíàëüíèì çàêîíîäàâñòâîì ìàº áóòè âèçíà÷åíå óí³âåðñàëüíå ïîíÿòòÿ íà ì³æäåðæàâíî-ìó ð³âí³, ùî çàáåçïå÷èòü çàõèñò òà ïîïåðåäæåííÿ ºäèíî¿ ñèñòåìè äåðæàâíî¿ â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ â äåðæàâ³. Ïðîáëåìà äåðæàâíî¿â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ çà â÷èíåííÿ ÿäåðíî¿ øêîäè ïîðóøóº ïèòàííÿ, ÿê³ ìàþòü áóòè âèçíà÷åí³ ó ðàìêàõ çàãàëüíèõ ì³æíàðîäíèõ ïðà-âèë, ùî ñòîñóþòüñÿ ïèòàíü â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³. Îêð³ì òîãî, çìåíøåííÿ ô³íàíñîâèõ íàñë³äê³â â³ä ÿäåðíî¿ øêîäè øëÿõîì âñòàíîâ-ëåííÿ ïåâíî¿ êîìïåíñàö³¿ ÷åðåç áàçó â³äïîâ³äàëüíîñò³ çà â÷èíåí³ ä³¿ âñòàíîâëþº âàæëèâèé êîìïîíåíò ðåæèìó äëÿ áåçïå÷íîãîâèêîðèñòàííÿ ÿäåðíî¿ åíåðã³¿.Êëþ÷îâ³ ñëîâà: äåðæàâíà â³äïîâ³äàëüí³ñòü, äåðæàâíà ³ öèâ³ëüíà â³äïîâ³äàëüí³ñòü,  ÌÏÊ ïðîåêòè ñòàòåé, Ïàðèçüêèé ðå-æèì, Â³äåíñüêèé ðåæèì.
Ðåçþìå
Ïðàâîâûå òåîðèè ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè èëè ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé/ãðàæäàíñêîé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè çà íåïðàâîìåð-íûå äåéñòâèÿ è äåéñòâèÿ, çàïðåùåííûå ìåæäóíàðîäíûì çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâîì, äîëãîå âðåìÿ áûëè ïðåäìåòîì äèñêóññèè â ìåæ-íàðîäíîì ïóáëè÷íîì ïðàâå. Íàöèîíàëüíîå çàêîíîäàòåëüñòâî ðåãóëèðóåò ñèñòåìû ãðàæäàíñêîé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè â ïîëå ÷àñò-íûõ çàêîíîâ ãðàæäàí ãîñóäàðñòâà. Êàê ïðîòèâîïîëîæíîå îïðåäåëåíèþ ïîíÿòèÿ ãðàæäàíñêîé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè, íàöèîíàëüíûìçàêîíîäàòåëüñòâîì äîëæíî áûòü îïðåäåëåíî óíèâåðñàëüíîå ïîíÿòèå íà ìåæãîñóäàðñòâåííîì óðîâíå, ÷òî îáåñïå÷èò çàùèòó èïðåäóïðåäæåíèå åäèíîé ñèñòåìû ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé îòâåòñòâåííîñòè â ãîñóäàðñòâå. Ïðîáëåìà ãîñóäàðñòâåííîé îòâåòñòâåííîñ-òè çà íàíåñåíèå ÿäåðíîãî âðåäà ñòàâèò âîïðîñû, êîòîðûå äîëæíû áûòü îïðåäåëåíû  â ðàìêàõ îáùèõ ìåæäóíàðîäíûõ ïðàâèë,êîòîðûå êàñàþòñÿ âîïðîñîâ îòâåòñòâåííîñòè. Êðîìå òîãî, óìåíøåíèÿ ôèíàíñîâûõ ïîñëåäñòâèé îò ÿäåðíîãî âðåäà ïóòåì óñòà-íîâëåíèÿ îïðåäåëåííîé êîìïåíñàöèè ÷åðåç áàçó îòâåòñòâåííîñòè çà ñîâåðø¸ííûå äåéñòâèÿ, óñòàíàâëèâàåò âàæíûé êîìïîíåíòðåæèìà äëÿ áåçîïàñíîãî èñïîëüçîâàíèÿ  ÿäåðíîé ýíåðãèè.Êëþ÷åâûå ñëîâà: ãîñóäàðñòâåííàÿ îòâåòñòâåííîñòü, ãîñóäàðñòâåííàÿ è ãðàæäàíñêàÿ îòâåòñòâåííîñòü, ÌÏÊ ïðîåêòûñòàòåé, Ïàðèæñêèé ðåæèì, Âåíñêèé ðåæèì.
Summary
The legal theories of State responsibility and State/civil liability for injurious and internationally prohibited acts have been in thefocus of public international law for a long while. By means of domestic legislation, domestic laws govern the systems of civil liabil-ity within the area of private laws of individual States. As opposed to the framework of civil liability determined by diverse domesticrules, exclusively a standard regulation framed at an interstate level shall secure and preserve the uniform system of State liability.Obviously, the issue of State responsibility for nuclear damages raises specific questions to be examined in the framework of generalinternational regulations related to the spheres of responsibility and liability. Furthermore, the mitigation of the financial consequencesof a nuclear accident through prompt and adequate compensation via liability-based issues shall compose an important component ofthe regime for the safe utilization of nuclear energy.Key words: State responsibility, State and civil liability, ILCs Draft Articles, Paris regime, Vienna regime.Îòðèìàíî 25.11.2010
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